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institutions. The numbers are not 
negligible – interviews with CEOs in 2011
revealed that, for some institutions, the
annual provision for the FSCS in 2011
could reach 15 per cent of profits.
These unresolved issues not only put
pressure on balance sheets, which have
shrunk over the past four years, but are 
barriers to long-term planning. Yorkshire
Building Society and Coventry Building
Society were touted as possible bidders for
Northern Rock, but neither seemed able to
formalise capital instruments to raise funds.
Instead, the bank went to a consortium
fronted by Virgin Money and mainly 
capitalised by the US private equity com-
pany, W. L. Ross & Co. In 2010, Kent
Reliance, then the thirteenth-largest build-
ing society in the UK, ended up as a hybrid
model (partially demutualised) after a
recapitalisation by JC Flowers, the US 
private equity group, which subsequently
failed to acquire Northern Rock and
Principality, the UK’s seventh biggest build-
ing society. While these are new entrants, it
is legitimate to ask whether this is the com-
peting business model the Select
Committee and the ICB had in mind.
The question becomes more pressing
when one considers that restraints could
lead to further demutualisation. In the UK,
all building societies that chose to 
demutualise ended up state-owned, 
foreign-owned, or simply ceased to exist.
One consequence was further banking
concentration. According to the Building
Societies Association, 51 per cent of
national savings in 1987 were deposited
with building societies and 31 per cent with
banks. In 2010, mutuals had 18 per cent of
the savings market, and banks 62 per cent.
In the mortgage market, in 1987, building
societies had a 71 per cent share, and banks
19 per cent. In 2010, building societies had
15 per cent, while banks had 79 per cent.
This imbalance could be partially 
rectified if mutual institutions were to bid
for Lloyds Banking Group’s assets, particu-
larly because institutions such as
Nationwide, The Co-operative Bank and
Yorkshire have good historical loan-to-
deposits ratios. But even with reported
interest on the part of the Co-op and
Nationwide in Cheltenham & Gloucester,
it is unlikely they would be able to acquire
the whole lot.
New entrants and foreign competitors
may lack the funds and, to some extent,
even the appetite for growth. Tesco,
although less affected by the new pruden-
tial requirements than building societies,
has yet to enter mortgage and personal 
current account markets. The debut in the
former was postponed to 2012 and the
launch of personal accounts and branches
has no set deadline. Moreover, the crucial
question is whether the move to utility
banking will push players such as Tesco and
Virgin closer to, or further from, full service
retail banking, considering return on equity
is likely to fall. Some foreign banks, such as
Handelsbanken, do not rely on expanding
market share. Others, although admittedly
a tiny number, may have a parent bank in a
country with a more liberal regulatory
approach, which can lead to retreat and/or
cherry-picking in the UK. 
While banking may become safer, this
will not automatically translate into diverse
banking. Mutuals, in particular, need to be
considered. Also, will the new Financial
Conduct Authority, which should promote
competition, have the clout to interfere?
The relatively small number of alternative 
players and their weak lobbying power
compound the problem. 
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T
he UK needs more diversity in
retail banking. Both the Treasury
Select Committee, in its report
Competition and Choice in Retail
Banking, and the Independent
Commission on Banking, have stressed
this. The difficulty, however, is in getting
there. The challenge to the incumbents
should, in theory, come from nimbler
entrants, or smaller players like the mutu-
als. But it seems that incumbent retail
banks are no more likely to be challenged
now than  before the crisis. 
Part of the solution depends on the way
political and technical guidelines translate
into practice. But the changes of the past
three years, and the new requirements
already implemented, hardly point to a level
playing field, particularly for building 
societies and other mutuals. While the 
problems can be solved, a few issues need to
become concrete proposals at national and,
in some cases, supranational (EU) levels. 
Higher prudential requirements, for
instance, affect every UK retail institution.
They are, however, more complex for
mutuals, which cannot raise equity in the
capital markets. Hybrid capital, particularly
Permanent Interest Bearing Shares
(PIBS), is not deemed sufficiently loss-
absorbent to count as tier 1 capital. There
is nothing new here: capital issues for
building societies were the focus of a
Treasury report in March 2010 and the
ICB also recognised the issue.
Nevertheless, more than a year into a
debate between building societies and 
regulators about new instruments, there is
still no clear way forward.
Squeezing profitability further is the
Financial Services Compensation Scheme,
which perversely penalises lower-risk 
business models such as retail-funded 
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